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INTRODUCTION

Case law addressing advisory arbitration is relatively sparse
compared to that involving the more common, final and binding
Although there is a significant collection of
arbitration.'
scholarly books 2 and articles3 regarding final and binding
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The general scarcity of arbitration award case law is a result of the less than

of private sector arbitration awards that result in applications for judicial
review. See MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 778 (5th ed. 2003). Presumably, a logical inference can be drawn that
even a smaller number of advisory arbitration decisions result in requests for
judicial review.
Nevertheless, there is a significant body of reported case law concerning final
and binding labor arbitration under federal and New York law. See generally THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, 1291-1363 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001);
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Labor Arbitration Under New York Law, 64 N.Y.ST. B.J.,
Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 35-36 (discussing New York case law).
2 Some of the better books on final and binding labor arbitration include:
BRAND, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION (1998); COOPER ET AL., ADR IN
THE WORKPLACE (2d ed. 2005) (devoting a large part of textbook to labor
arbitration); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (Alan Miles Rubin et
al. eds., 6th ed. 2003); FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR
ARBITRATION 721 (Owen Fairweather & Ray J. Schoonhoven eds., 4th ed. 1999);
JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 186-250
(2d ed. 1999) (devoting an entire chapter on labor arbitration).
' Some of the more enlightening articles include: Roger I. Abrams et al.,
Arbitral Therapy, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1751 (1994); Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I.
Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373
1%

419

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 79:419

arbitration, there is virtually no scholarly material pertaining to
advisory arbitration.
More fundamentally, the little that is
written about advisory arbitration is often wrong or misleading.5
This article summarizes the law surrounding advisory
arbitration, with the goal of assisting attorneys and litigants in
determining whether advisory arbitration is a feasible form of
dispute resolution for their school district, agency, university, or
corporation. This article argues two points. First, given its lack
of finality, advisory arbitration in public or private-sector labormanagement relations serves little purpose. Secondly, however,
there may be a place for it in the non-union private or public
sector. Specifically, some employers may find it advantageous to
offer advisory arbitration because of the lack of finality.
Employees and employers will be given an opportunity to be
heard, which may decrease the amount of unnecessary court
litigation.
Indeed, the role of state law in labor relations is becoming
increasingly important. State courts have developed various
doctrines governing the field of private-sector employment law.6
(1983); Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The
Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557 (1983); Rubinstein, supra note 1.
The use of labor arbitration in labor management relations has a long history.
See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door of Justice: Arbitration

Agreements that Expand Court Review of An Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.

561 (2004) (discussing the history of labor arbitration).
4 The leading treatise on labor arbitration only briefly
mentions advisory
arbitration. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 1366. The leading treatise on

New York Practice only devotes a paragraph to advisory arbitration. See DAVID D.
SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 586, at 981 (3d ed. 1999). The lone treatise on New
York Education law merely devotes two short paragraphs to advisory arbitration.
See SCHOOL LAW §§ 10:80, :82 (30th ed. 2004). Even the major treatise on public
sector labor law in New York only devotes only a few paragraphs to advisory

arbitration. See PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 818-19 (Jerome

Lefkowitz et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998).
- See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 1366 (describing advisory
arbitration as a type of non-binding fact finding process); SIEGEL, supra note 4, at
981 (stating that advisory arbitration is where the parties merely agree to consider
the advisory award); Harvey Randall, Advisory Arbitration, 1999 No. 11 Pub. EMP.
L. NOTES 225 (1999) (stating that there is nothing available to the prevailing party
to compel compliance with the award); Vincent C. Alexander, Practice
Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501, at 11 (McKinney 1998) (describing advisory
arbitration as non-binding unless both parties accept it).
As discussed herein, the fundamental mistake most of these commentators make
is that under New York Law the decision of an employer to accept or reject an
advisory arbitration is subject to C.P.L.R. article 78 review.
6 See 8 MICHAEL J. CANAN & DAVID L. GREGORY, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
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It is submitted that one such area of state law that should be
further developed is advisory arbitration.
Before a substantive discussion of the law concerning
advisory arbitration can begin, it is first helpful to understand
what it is. Advisory arbitration is a form of alternative dispute
resolution, or ADR,7 which recommends how a certain dispute
may be resolved. Unlike other forms of non-binding ADR,
advisory arbitration is a real form of grievance resolution under a
collective bargaining agreement by a labor arbitrator or, in the
case of a non-union employer, an employee handbook. Advisory
arbitration is somewhat different from other forms of ADR
because of the nature of labor relations' and because a party
cannot simply reject an arbitration award it does not like. As
will be discussed in further detail, the decision to accept advisory
arbitration is subject to limited judicial review. Limited judicial
review is the distinguishing characteristic of advisory
arbitration.9

PRACTICE § 10609 (3d ed. 2000); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES
AND MATERIAL ON EMPLOYMENT LAw 41-157 (2004) (discussing employment law in
relation to employment-at-will doctrine).
7 Much is written on Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution ("ADR") and this
article makes no attempt to analyze the various ADR methods. Some of the
preeminent literature on this topic includes: HOW ADR WORKS (Norman Brand ed.,
2002); Kenneth Cloke, Journeys into the Heart of Conflict, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
219 (2004); Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing ContractualAnalysis of ADR Agreements by
Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1
(2004).
8 Parties to a collective bargaining agreement are involved in a continuing
relationship. Employees covered by such agreements, who are often the grievants in
labor arbitrations, are a type of third party beneficiary under that collective
agreement. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (discussing the
nature of collective bargaining agreements).
9 Advisory arbitration is sometimes referred to as "non-binding arbitration."
See, eg., Elba Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Newman, 101 A.D.2d 1003, 1004, 476 N.Y.S.2d 949,
950 (4th Dep't 1984); Nassau Chapter of Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. County
of Nassau, 84 A.D.2d 784, 785, 443 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (2d Dep't 1981). That
terminology is particularly used outside the field of public sector labor law. See, e.g.,
Kilmer v. Flocar, 212 F.R.D. 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mottolese, 803
A.2d 311, 313 (Conn. 2002).
Significantly, however, non-binding arbitration is sometimes used to refer to a
method of alternative dispute resolution where one party can reject the non-binding
decision, but may be subjected to a penalty if that party does not receive a larger
award in litigation. See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of CourtConnected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 2169, 2218 (1993); Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court Connected
Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 132
n.83 (2004). That type of non-binding arbitration is different from the type of
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Advisory arbitration is predominately used today in publicsector labor-management relations.' ° The states where advisory
arbitration is utilized include, but are not necessarily limited to,
Michigan,"1 California, 2 New Jersey, 3 Ohio, 4 and of course, New
York,' 5 which is the focus of this Article. The major difference
between private-sector labor law and public-sector labor law is
that, in most states, such as7 New York,' 6 public-sector unions do
not have the right to strike.'
Advisory arbitration is most prevalent in the field of school
district-union labor-management relations. This is demonstrated
by the fact that most of the reported decisions involving advisory

advisory arbitration discussed in this Article in that there is no sanction on a party
if they reject the award of an advisory arbitrator.
'0 Abrams et al., supra note 3, at 1756. This Article does not attempt to survey
all the states and industries that utilize advisory arbitration. Rather, the focus of
this work is advisory arbitration under New York law.
" See AFSCME v. Highland Park Bd. of Educ., 542 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995).
12 See Joseph R. Grodin, Public Employee Bargainingin California:The MeyersMilias-Brown Act in the Courts, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1999) (discussing case law).
For a recent example, see Mulllican v. City of Ontario, No. E035001, 2005 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (where litigation over employment
termination continued after advisory arbitrator rejected employees claim).
13 See Ronald T. Hyman, The Forum Matters: A Union Victory Under a
Restrained Court Decision, 104 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1995) (discussing case law).
"4 See Ohio Ass'n of Pub. Sch. Employees v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 735 N.E.2d 493, 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
" Because there are several reported decisions on this topic from the New York
Court of Appeals, this Article focuses on New York Law. See Benjamin Rush
Employees United v. McCarthy, Jr., 76 N.Y.2d 781, 782, 559 N.E.2d 652, 653, 559
N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (1990); Plainedge Fed'n of Teachers v. Plainedge Union Free Sch.
Dist., 58 N.Y.2d 902, 903, 447 N.E.2d 50, 51, 460 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1983); Bd. of
Educ. of the Yonkers City Sch. Dist. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 46 N.Y.2d 727,
728, 385 N.E.2d 1297, 1298, 413 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (1978). There are also several
appellate level decisions that collectively make up a body of law, albeit limited, given
the small numbers involved, which can be examined. See Thomas v. County of
Nassau, 10 A.D.3d 359, 360, 780 N.Y.S.2d 296, 296 (2d Dep't 2004); Carter v. County
of Nassau, 8 A.D.3d 603, 603, 778 N.Y.S.2d 911, 911 (2d Dep't 2004); Nassau
Chapter of Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. County of Nassau, 249 A.D.2d 472, 473,
671 N.Y.S.2d 665, 665 (2d Dep't 1998); Hempstead Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Bd.
of Educ., 112 A.D.2d 267, 267, 491 N.Y.S.2d 716, 716 (2d Dep't 1985); Berlyn v. Bd.
of Educ. of the E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 80 A.D.2d 572, 573, 435 N.Y.S.2d
793, 794 (2d Dep't 1981), affid, 55 N.Y.2d 912, 433 N.E.2d 1278, 449 N.Y.S.2d 30
(1982).
16 See generally, PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at
727-28.
17 8 CANAN & GREGORY, supra note 6, § 10763.
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arbitration involve school districts and their unions."8 There does

not appear to be any particular reason for this. In the context of
public-sector labor-management relations, many typical laborrelations matters are subject to advisory arbitration;19 for
example, disputes over the use of personal days,20 sabbaticals, 1
employee discharges, 22 sick leave,2 3 coverage of substitute
teachers under a collective bargaining agreement,2' job
responsibilities, 25 class schedules for teachers, 26 reduction in
hours, 7 salary,28 and placing material in an employee's personnel
1s

A Lexis search (advisory w/2 arbitration) in the New York cases directory on

November 1, 2004 yielded twenty-four reported cases involving advisory arbitration.
Significantly, seventeen of those decisions, or about 59% of the reported cases,
involved public education. Of perhaps greater significance, all of the New York Court
of Appeals decisions involving advisory arbitration were in the field of public
education. See supra note 15.
However, these statistics are probably not completely accurate for several
reasons. First, New York, like many jurisdictions, does not report all court decisions.
Some of these decisions, however, may be available online through the state court
system's website, www.courts.state.ny.us. Many commentators have been critical of
this practice. See Maria Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on
Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202 (2003). Second, as mentioned earlier,
advisory arbitration is sometimes referred to as "non-binding arbitration." However,
some forms of "non-binding arbitration" refer to alternative forms of dispute
resolution that materially differ from advisory arbitration. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text. If the court does not use the term "advisory arbitration," it may
not show up on a search.
The fact that advisory arbitration is often utilized in the field of public education
is also demonstrated by the fact that advisory arbitration is discussed in the only
treatise on New York Education law. SCHOOL LAW, supra note 4, §§ 10:80, :82
'9 This list is merely intended to be illustrative; not an exhaustive list of issues
that have been subject to advisory arbitration.
20 See Elmont Elementary Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. Elmont Union Free
Sch. Dist., No. 8704/03 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. Jan. 21, 2004), affd, 11 A.D.3d 687, 782
N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 2004).
21 See Bd. of Educ. of the Yonkers City Sch. Dist. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers,
46 N.Y.2d 727, 728-29, 385 N.E.2d 1297, 1298, 413 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (1978);
O'Brien v. Bd. of Educ., 71 A.D.2d 605, 606, 418 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (2d Dep't 1979).
22 See Benjamin Rush Employees United v. McCarthy, Jr., 76 N.Y.2d 781, 782,
559 N.E.2d 652, 653, 559 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (1990).
23 See Plainedge Fed'n of Teachers v. Plainedge Union Free Sch. Dist., 58 N.Y.2d
902, 905, 447 N.E.2d 50, 54, 460 N.Y.S.2d 502, 505 (1983).
24 See id. at 905, 447 N.E.2d at 54, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
25 Sec. & Law Enforcement Employees Dist. 82 v. Hartnett, 119 A.D.2d 877,
878-98, 500 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (3d Dep't 1986); Ohio Ass'n of Public Sch. Employees
v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 735 N.E.2d 493, 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
26 Post-Adjunct Faculty Ass'n. v. Bd. of Tr. of Long Island Univ., 127 A.D.2d
644, 644, 511 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (2d Dep't 1987).
27 Berlyn v. Bd. of Educ., 80 A.D.2d 572, 435 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2d Dep't 1981), affd,
55 N.Y.2d 912, 433 N.E.2d 1278, 449 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1982).
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I.

ADVISORY ARBITRATION UNDER NEW YORK LAW

A party does not have carte blanche to reject an arbitration
decision simply because it is advisory. The New York Court of
Appeals held that, after an advisory arbitration, a party's
decision to either accept or reject the arbitrator's determination
is subject to limited judicial review under article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.). In Plainedge
Federationof Teachers v. Plainedge Union Free School District,

after a public employer prevailed in an advisory arbitration, the
school district adopted the arbitrator's determination. ° The
Union sued, claiming the employer's decision to accept the award
was arbitrary and capricious and therefore improper under
article 78.31 In upholding the public employer's decision, the
28

Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Fed'n of Teachers, 92 A.D.2d 599, 600, 459

N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (2d Dep't 1983).

29 Bd. of Coop. Educ. Serv. v. BOCES Teachers' Association, 111 A.D.2d 168,

168, 488 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (2d Dept. 1985).
30 Plainedge Fed'n of Teachers v. Plainedge Union Free Sch. Dist., 58 N.Y.2d
902, 903, 447 N.E.2d 50, 51, 460 N.Y.S.2d, 502, 503 (1983).
"1 Id. at 903, 447 N.E.2d at 51, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 503. Article 78 of the New York
C.P.L.R. is a procedural statute whereby certain actions of public bodies, as well as
corporate bodies, can be judicially reviewed. See SIEGEL, supra note 4, § 557, at 916.
Under C.P.L.R. article 78, courts pay deference to the determination made by the
body or corporation and its review is limited. See City of New York v. O'Connor, 9
A.D.3d 328, 329, 780 N.Y.S.2d 590, 592 (1st Dep't 2004).
The standard of review employed by a reviewing court depends upon the nature
of the article 78 proceeding. There are three basic categories of these proceedings: (1)
certiorari, which typically involves a review of an administrative determination
taken after a "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" hearing; (2) mandamus, which compels a
body to take certain action which is required of it under the law; and (3) prohibition
which prevents a body from exceeding its own jurisdiction. SIEGEL, supra note 4, §
557, at 917.
Advisory arbitration would probably fall into the mandamus category. In an
article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus, courts review determinations
under a "substantial evidence test." Id. Under this standard, a reviewing court
examines the entire record to determine whether there is a rational basis for the
decision. The evidence must be more than "seeming or imaginary," however, this
standard is less than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Where there is
room for choice, courts will defer to the administrative determination. See 300
Gramatan Ave. Ass'n. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 182, 379
N.E.2d 1183, 1187, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 57 (1978).
In reality, the lines between these three categories, which stem from the old
common writs, are blurred, SIEGEL, supra note 4, § 557, at 917, and, not
surprisingly, the standard of review is also blurred. For example, the test for
mandamus-whether the action complained of is arbitrary and capricious-is
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Court explained:
The appropriate standard of review of the determination of the
district, therefore, is that applicable to article 78 proceedings.
Under this standard, it cannot be said as a matter of law that
the district's determination was arbitrary or capricious. Its
determination, based in large part on "careful consideration [of]
the recommendations of the arbitrator" in accordance with the
agreement of the parties finds support both in the plain terms of
the agreement and in the prior bargaining history between the
district and union. The determination, therefore, was properly
upheld.32

Thus, although admittedly subject to limited judicial review,
a party cannot simply sit back and reject an advisory
determination that it does not like-there is some judicial review.
It is the parties' ability to seek judicial review that distinguishes
advisory arbitration from other so-called "non-binding" forms of
ADR.3 3
Yet, the distinguishing characteristic of advisory
arbitration as being subject to judicial review is something that
commentators have regrettably overlooked.3 4
In labor arbitration, arbitrators often try to get the parties to
agree on a submission: a simple statement of the issue(s) to be
decided. The issue in a typical discharge case, for example, is
often framed as "whether the grievant was discharged for just
cause; if not what shall the remedy be?"3 5 However, if the
indistinguishable, according to Professor Siegel, from the substantial evidence
standard discussed above. Id. § 561, at 927-28.
Note that under the arbitrary and capricious standard courts do not interfere
unless there is no rational basis for the decision. Pell v. Bd. of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222,
231, 313 N.E.2d 321, 325, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974). The arbitrary and
capricious standard is chiefly concerned with whether a particular action is without
foundation in fact. Id. at 231, 313 N.E.2d 321, 325, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839. It is
beyond the scope of this article to examine C.P.L.R. article 78 proceedings in any
greater detail.
32 Plainedge, 58 N.Y.2d at 904, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 503, 447 N.E.2d at 51
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
"3 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
34 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" A leading labor arbitration treatise states:
Sometimes the parties agree to a statement of the issue during the course
of the hearing, when the evidence places the dispute in sharper focus. The
arbitrator also may initiate a discussion to clarify the issue and its scope,
which could produce a different statement, perhaps worded by the
arbitrator and accepted by the parties. In many cases, the arbitrator must
clarify the issue. The parties may request it or the contract may provide
that if the parties do not agree on the issue, it will be determined by the
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arbitration is advisory, the parties must carefully formulate the
submission. If the submission is not carefully formulated, the
parties may unwittingly convert an otherwise advisory
arbitration into one that is final and binding. That is precisely
what happened in Board of Education Yonkers City School
District v. Yonkers Federationof Teachers.3 6
In Yonkers, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with
the issue of whether a particular dispute was subject to advisory
or final and binding arbitration under the parties' agreement.
The Court did not decide what the collective bargaining
agreement required. Rather, the Court held that the stipulation
concerning the remedy transformed the advisory arbitration into
a final and binding arbitration:
Even assuming that the terms of the agreement mandated that
the award be advisory only, the submission of the grievance to
the arbitrator expressly empowered him to fashion a remedy to
resolve the controversy. This stipulation in and of itself,
divested the courts of power to inquire into the procedural
standards used by the arbitrator in rendering the award 7
Twelve years later, the Court of Appeals revisited the issue
of advisory arbitration and held that the submission of the
issue-"was the discharge of grievant... for just cause? If not,
what shall the remedy be?"-did not transform an advisory
arbitration into a final and binding one.38
The Court
distinguished Yonkers on its facts and based its subsequent
decision on the wording of the particular arbitration clause at
issue:
This argument ignores the language of the clause at issue,
which makes arbitration awards definitively advisory "unless
accepted by both parties."
The parties have an express
contractual option to accept or reject a decision after the
arbitrator renders it. Petitioner's transformation, therefore,
would render the clause a nullity.
[Yonkers] is not to the contrary. The arbitration clause there
arbitrator. The arbitrator may incorporate the parties' separate
submissions into one of his or her own wording, or adopt one party's
wording as an accurate statement of the issue.
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 296-97.
36 46 N.Y.2d 727, 385 N.E.2d 1297, 413 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1978).
17 Id. at 729, 385 N.E.2d at 1298, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (citations
omitted).
38 Benjamin Rush Employees United v. McCarthy, Jr., 76 N.Y.2d 781, 782, 559
N.Y.S.2d 958, 959, 559 N.E.2d 652, 653 (1990).
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was binding only as to the specific issue submitted, and the
agreement provided that the arbitrator was to be so notified.
The parties waived the advisory nature of the arbitration by
requesting a remedy without including any limitation on the
arbitrator's power to bind them. Here, the clause made the
arbitration undeviatingly advisory unless tle parties expressly
and affirmatively elected to be bound.3 9

If an arbitration award is advisory, it cannot be confirmed
under the C.P.L.R., which, in turn, means that it cannot be
converted into a judgment.4 ° Significantly, however, either before
or after an advisory arbitration, the parties can still sue for
breach of contract vis-a-vis the collective bargaining agreement 4
absent clear contractual language that would bar such an
action.4 2
Accordingly, in CSEA v. Plainedge Union Free School
District,43 after the union prevailed in an advisory arbitration,
the employer rejected the advisory arbitration award; yet,
instead of instituting an article 78 proceeding, the union brought
an action for breach of contract under the collective bargaining
agreement. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of
the union on the breach of the collective bargaining contract
claim.
In reaching its decision, the court applied familiar
principles of contract law and concluded that the employer
breached the contract.44
However, in two recent appellate division decisions, the court
39 Id.
40 Id.

at 782, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 959, 559 N.E.2d at 653.

at 782, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 959, 559 N.E.2d at 653; see also Civil Serv.

Employees Ass'n v. County of Nassau, 249 A.D.2d 472, 473, 671 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666
(2d Dep't 1998).
41 See Thomas v. County of Nassau, 10 A.D.3d 359, 360, 780 N.Y.S.2d 296, 296
(2d Dep't 2004); Carter v. County of Nassau, 8 A.D.3d 603, 603, 778 N.Y.S.2d 911,
911 (2d Dep't 2004); Hempstead Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 112
A.D.2d 267, 267, 491 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (2d Dep't 1985); Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n,
Inc., v. Plainedge Union Free Sch. Dist., N.Y. L.J., July 15, 2003, at 21, col. 1 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County).
42 See, e.g., Berlyn v. Bd. of Educ. of the E. Meadow Union Free Sch.
Dist., 80
A.D.2d 572, 573, 435 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (2d Dep't 1981) (dismissing the breach of
contract action after advisory arbitration because the collective bargaining
agreement provided that the parties' exclusive remedy was the grievance procedure),
affl'd, 55 N.Y.2d 912, 433 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).
43 12 A.D.3d 395, 786 N.Y.S.2d 59 (2d Dep't 2004).
4 Id. at 396, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 60. The court reasoned that contracts are to be
construed in accordance with the intent of the parties, the best evidence of the
parties' intent is the written contract, and that a clear written agreement must be
enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms. Id.
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dismissed article 78 proceedings challenging the rejection of
advisory arbitration, reasoning that the award was not subject to
an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review.45 While both
courts recognized that a cause of action for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement was properly pled, it is difficult
to reconcile these decisions with Plainedge Federation of
Teachers v. Plainedge Union Free School District, as both courts
performed little to no substantive analysis.
One can only
theorize that these two decisions-involving not only the same
public employer, but also the same causes of action for breach of
contract and a second cause of action pursuant to article 78were based upon specific collective bargaining agreement
language that limited article 78 court review when a breach of
contract action was also filed.4 6
In labor law, an action for breach of contract would certainly
be unusual, but not unheard of. A leading text on labormanagement relations has recognized that "[n]ot all collective
bargaining agreements provide for arbitration., 47 Further, in a
treatise on federal administrative practice and labor relations,
Professor David L. Gregory explained that where a collective
bargaining agreement does not contain final and binding
arbitration, other resolution techniques may be adopted,
including having the issue resolved by management, by a joint
union-management committee, or even by a labor strike.4 8
Where there is no final and binding arbitration under a collective
bargaining agreement, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that an action for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement may be maintained.4 9
41 See Thomas, 10 A.D.3d. at 359, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 296; Carter, 8 A.D.3d at 60304, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
46 If this is in fact the case, the question of whether the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement can limit judicial review of article 78 proceedings is an
interesting legal issue which is beyond the scope of this Article. However, whether
parties to an agreement which provides for final and binding arbitration can limit
judicial review is also a developing area of the law. See Samuel Estreicher & Steven
C. Bennett, EliminatingJudicial Review of Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 2004, at
3.
47 GETMAN ETAL., supra note 2, at 189.
48 8 CANAN & GREGORY, supra note 6, § 10763; see also Groves v. Ring Screw
Works, 498 U.S. 168, 169 (1990) (illustrating where a collective bargaining
agreement permitted parties to utilize economic weapons after exhausting the
grievance procedure which did not provide for any final form of dispute resolution
such as arbitration).
49 See Groves, 498 U.S. at 175-76; Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319,
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II. VALUE OF ADVISORY ARBITRATION

Because of the limited nature of advisory arbitration,
Professor David D. Siegel, in his seminal treatise on New York
Practice, questions whether there is any value in advisory
arbitration. ° Although an advisory award may not be binding, a
party who agrees to advisory arbitration can be compelled to
arbitrate.5 1 Therefore, the law implicitly recognizes that advisory
arbitration does serve a purpose.
While final and binding arbitration is the gold standard in
dispute resolution in labor relations, there is certainly some
value in having advisory arbitration. For the employer the value
is obvious. The award is non-binding so the employer does not
have to comply with it-at least where the employer has some
rational basis for rejecting the award.
However, the union also obtains some benefit. Advisory
arbitration affords the union an opportunity to be heard and, at
the same time, requires that the employer consider the advisory
arbitration award. In perhaps the most significant case in labor
arbitration history, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that the process of arbitrating claims may have a therapeutic
52
value even if the underlying grievance is frivolous.
Nevertheless, given the uncertainty of advisory arbitration,
329-30 (1989); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 700 (1966).
Indeed, at least one Circuit has held that if an employer refuses to arbitrate a

grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, its actions constitute a
repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement with respect to that particular
grievance. Therefore, an individual grievant can bring an action in court for breach
of contract. See Sidhu v. Flecto Co., Inc., 279 F.3d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 2002).
50 SIEGEL, supra note 4, § 586, at 981. Professor Siegel states:
It has even been held that a merely "advisory arbitration," i.e., one not
binding on the parties but whose result they agree to "consider," is
permissible under this provision, but such an "award," if that it be, may be
too elusive to confirm into a judgment. One may even wonder what is
gained by such a transmutation, since an unenforceable judgment is not
much better than an unenforceable award.
Id.
51 See Citibank N.A. v. Bankers Trust Co., 221 A.D.2d 222, 222, 633 N.Y.S.2d
314, 314 (1st Dep't 1995); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cracovia, 36
A.D.2d 851, 852, 321 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497-98 (2d Dep't 1971); Alexander, supra note 5,
at 307.
2 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am.
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960), stated: 'The processing of even frivolous claims
may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant
environment may be quite unaware." For a critical analysis of whether arbitration
does indeed have such therapeutic values, see Abrams et al., supra note 3.
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one might ask, "Why would a union voluntarily agree to this?"
The answer, though not subject to exact proof, is quite simple. It
is a question of economic and political power. No union, or more
accurately, almost no union, would want to agree to advisory
arbitration. The issue is not what the union wants or desires,
but what the union can achieve through collective bargaining. In
the private sector, a union may not be strong enough to insist on
final and binding arbitration to the point of a strike, or, in the
public sector, to the point of an impasse. Alternatively, a union
may decide that a wage increase or a certain fringe benefit is
more important than final and binding arbitration. Employees in
a certain industry or location, who are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, may be in great demand. Therefore, final
and binding arbitration may be less important to them because
they could easily obtain equivalent employment.
This, in turn, raises the question of whether it is in the
unionized employer's interest to agree to advisory arbitration as
distinguished from final and binding arbitration. As noted
earlier, employers will probably say yes initially, but, upon closer
analysis, may wish to reconsider. Advisory arbitration can
actually cost the employer more in terms of time and money. In
addition to the costs associated with the advisory arbitration, the
employer may be subjected to an article 78 proceeding if it rejects
the advisory determination and/or a plenary action for breach of
the collective bargaining contract.5 3 Thus, advisory arbitration
may be the first step in a lengthy and costly litigation process. In
such circumstances, advisory arbitration would serve little value.
On the other hand, advisory arbitration might serve some
benefit.
Specifically, each side would see their adversary's
position and the respective strengths and weaknesses in a party's
case might be exposed.
Further, if a party simply rejects
advisory arbitration, it leaves the dispute open. This does not
appear to be in anyone's interest, and one must question the
value of such categorical tejections. The employer's ability to
reject the award is tempered by the union's ability to commence
additional litigation against the employer. These competing
policy concerns must be weighed and balanced by both sides in
deciding whether advisory arbitration is in their best interests.
Today, labor arbitration is a firmly established fact of life in
53 See supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
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One can conclude that the
labor management relations. 4
arbitration is a direct
advisory
concerning
law
case
scarcity of
no small part to the
in
result of the paucity of its use, owing
competing factors and policy concerns described above. This is
particularly telling, given the preferred status of labor
arbitration in this country. 5
III. ADVISORY ARBITRATION IN THE NON-UNION WORKPLACE
In examining the utility of advisory arbitration, it is
important to note that its use is not limited to public-sector labor
relations. Advisory arbitration has been utilized in some privatesector collective bargaining contracts," as well as in some
commercial agreements. 7
While advisory arbitration has little value in public and
private-sector disputes under a collective bargaining agreement,
it may have a certain appeal to employers and employees who are
not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Only 7.9% of
the nation's private-sector work force is unionized, while 36.4% of
the public sector is unionized. 8 These percentages leave the vast
majority of the American work force without coverage under a
collective bargaining agreement. 9
One study concluded that 98% of collective bargaining agreements contained
labor arbitration provisions. Presumably, this study was referring to final and
binding arbitration. See Abrams et al., supra note 3, at 1756 n.17.
Indeed, in NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches Inc., 732 F.2d 872, 876 (iith Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984), the court referred to language in a
collective bargaining agreement which required "just or sufficient cause" to
discipline or terminate an employee as "a common non-controversial clause."
15 See, e.g., AT&T Tech. v. CWA, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (stating that
"arbitration is the preferred method of resolving disputes" under collective
bargaining agreements); United States Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. &
Indem. Ass'n, 197 F.3d 631, 639 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that "arbitration is favored in
our judicial system"); Bd. of Educ. v. Christa Constr., Inc., 80 N.Y.2d 1031, 1032, 608
N.E. 2d 755, 755, 593 N.Y.S.2d 178, 178 (1992) (stating that the New York Court of
Appeals "has repeatedly held that arbitration is a favored method of dispute
resolution in New York").
56 See Post-Adjunct Faculty Ass'n v. Bd. of Tr. of Long Island Univ., 127 A.D.2d
644, 644, 511 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (2d Dep't 1987).
17 See Citibank N.A. v. Bankers Trust Co., 221 A.D.2d 222, 222, 633 N.Y.2d 314,
314-15; In re Todd Shipyard Corp., 67 A.D.2d 646, 646, 412 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377 (1st
Dep't 1979) ("[E]ven advisory arbitration awards are not unknown to the law."),
aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 809, 403 N.E.2d 964, 426 N.Y.S.2d 980 (2d Dep't 1980).
" U.S. Department of Labor, Union Members Summary, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm (last modified Jan. 27, 2005).
'9 In states like New York, because of the employment-at-will doctrine, non54
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To achieve industrial due process, some enlightened
employers may actually find that it makes good business sense to
agree to advisory arbitration in order to reduce employee strife.6"
If advisory arbitration can be utilized in the public sector to
contest an employee's termination,61 there are no policy or legal
reasons why it could not be utilized in the private sector.62
Indeed, in the unionized sector, labor arbitration is considered a
substitute for industrial strife. 63 Advisory arbitration can and, in
some instances, should be considered as a similar substitute in a
non-union workplace.
However, if private-sector employers agree to include an
advisory arbitration provision in an employee handbook,6 for
example, the decision of the employer to accept or reject the
advisory arbitration would be subject to the same article 78
review as those in the public sector. By deciding to include an
advisory arbitration provision the employer would inevitably
relinquish some level of control but, given the highly deferential
standard of review in article 78 proceedings, such relinquishment
would be minimal.
While article 78 is not generally understood as applying to
private corporations, it is indeed applicable.6 5 In fact, there are
several reported decisions challenging corporate determinations

union employees are left with virtually no protection against arbitrary discipline.
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
60 The public policy of the United States is to reduce industrial strife and unrest
because that can burden or obstruct interstate commence. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).

While this policy is set forth in the National Labor Relations Act, a little known fact

is that some provisions of the National Labor Relations Act apply equally to non-

union employees. That concept has been referred to as the "'one of the best-kept

secrets of labor law."' IBM Corp., 2004 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 301, at *87 (2004) (Liebman
and Walsh, dissenting) (quoting William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of
the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002)).
6 As discussed herein, there is little value to advisory arbitration to resolve
disputes under a collective bargaining agreement. See supra Part II.
62 See Benjamin Rush Employees United v. McCarthy, Jr., 76 N.Y.2d
781, 782,
559 N.E.2d 652, 653, 559 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (1990).
63 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S.
574, 578 (1960).

' Relatively few non-union employees have formal employment contracts.
Those most likely to have them are executives or other employees with special skill
or knowledge. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw § 9.2 (3d ed. 2005).
65 24A CARMODY-WAIT 2D §145:1141 (2000); Alexander, supra note 5, § 7802, at
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under article 78.66 Additionally, there are a significant amount of
reported decisions challenging decisions of private universities
under article 78.67 Article 78 has even been expanded to apply to
unincorporated associations, at least68where the association or its
members are chartered by the state.
The rationale supporting the application of article 78 to
private corporations is based on the fact that corporations are
legal entities created by the government. Therefore, the law
implies that courts have "a supervisory or visitorial power ...to

see that corporations act agreeably to the end of their institution,
that they keep within the limits of their lawful powers, and to
69
correct and punish abuses of their franchises.
70
are
Thus, corporations and educational institutions
compelled,
be
can
which
bodies
considered quasi-governmental
via article 78, to comply with statutory obligations as well as
obligations imposed by their own internal regulations or
bylaws.7 1
72
For example, in Maas v. Cornell University, the Court of
Appeals stated that a professor at a private university could
bring an article 78 proceeding against Cornell University
alleging that the University failed to follow its own procedures in
66 See, e.g., Hanchard v. Facilities Dev. Corp., 85 N.Y.2d 638, 640, 651 N.E.2d

872, 873, 628 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (1995) (article 78 challenging termination of employee
under employee handbook provisions); 24A CARMODY-WAIT 2D, supra note 65, §
145:1141; 6 N.Y. JUR.2D Article 78 and Related Proceedings§114 (1997) (adding that
a private non-for profit corporation may also be subject to article 78); Alexander,
supra note 5, § 7802, at 289.
67 See, e.g., Berkeley-Caines v. St. John Fisher Coll., 11 A.D.3d 895, 895, 782
N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (4th Dep't 2004) (article 78 proceeding challenging the denial of
tenure); Postol v. St. Joseph's Coll., 8 A.D.3d 289, 290, 777 N.Y.S.2d 699, 699 (2d
Dep't 2004) (article 78 proceeding challenging the denial of tenure); Gray v. Canisius
Coll. of Buffalo, 76 A.D.2d 30, 31, 430 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (4th Dep't 1980) (article 78
proceeding challenging dismissal of tenured teacher).
6 See Brodsky v. Friedlander, 191 Misc. 2d 459, 459-60, 744 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796
(Erie County 2002) (article 78 proceeding brought by professor challenging the
determination of an unincorporated association to close a Otolaryngology residency
training program for doctors).
69 Gray, 76 A.D.2d at 33, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (4th Dep't 1980) (quoting
Weidenfeld v. Keppler, 84 A.D. 235, 237, 82 N.Y.S. 634, 636, (1st Dep't), affd, 176
N.Y. 562, 68 N.E. 1125 (1903)).
70 See, e.g., Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (2d Dep't
1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); Kwiatkowski v.
Ithaca Coll., 82 Misc. 2d 43, 368 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. Tomkins County 1975); Ryan
2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc.
71 Gray, 76 A.D.2d at 33, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
72 94 N.Y.2d 87, 721 N.E.2d 966, 699 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1999).
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investigating a sexual harassment complaint filed by a student
against a professor. "
Similarly, in Drucker v. Hofstra University,14 a professor
brought an article 78 proceeding against his employer, a private
university, challenging his removal from his position as
department chair. In Gray v. Canisius College, an article 78
proceeding was brought against a private college challenging a
professor's termination,7 5 and in Berkeley-Caines v. St. John
Fischer College, a professor brought an article 78 proceeding
against a private college challenging the denial of tenure.76
In Hanchard v. Facilities Development Corp., a terminated
employee sued his former employer, a private corporation, under
C.P.L.R. article 78, claiming that his termination was arbitrary
and capricious because the employer did not follow its own pretermination procedures set forth in its employee handbook. 77
Though the Court of Appeals dismissed the article 78 proceeding
based on the employer's substantial compliance with its own
policies, and any departure from those policies was due to the
petitioners failure to cooperate, Hanchard is instructive because
the Court held that a terminated employee could bring an article
78 proceeding against his or her private employer if the employer
fails to follow its employee handbook.78 Thus, if an employer
provides for advisory arbitration in its handbook, the employer's
decision to accept or reject the award of the advisory arbitrator
will be subject to article 78 review.
The question then becomes:
Why would any private
employer agree to advisory arbitration?
There are several
reasons in support of an employer's decision to do so. First, there
are the equities at bar in the matter. There are many states,
such as New York, which still hold to the common law
71 See Id. at 90, 721 N.E.2d at 967, 699 N.Y.S.2d
at 717; see also Stoll v. Cornell
Univ., 94 N.Y.2d 162, 164-65, 723 N.E.2d 65, 66-67, 701 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317-18
(1999) (article 78 proceeding challenging a decision of a private university).
14 279 A.D.2d 472, 719 N.Y.S.2d
263 (2d Dep't 2001).
7' 76 A.D.2d at 31, 430 N.Y.S.2d
at 164.
76 11 A.D.3d 895, 782 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (4th Dep't 2004).
7' 85 N.Y.2d 638, 641, 651 N.E.2d 872, 873,
628 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (1995).
Presumably, the plaintiff in that case did not belong to a union. However, there is no
discussion in the decision whether or not the employee belonged to a union. Had he
belonged to a union, his employment would have been subject to the collective
bargaining agreement.
78 Id. at 642, 651 N.E.2d at 874, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (citing Mitchell v. Dowdell,
172 A.D.2d 1032, 569 N.Y.S.2d 291 (4th Dep't 1991)).
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employment-at-will doctrine.79 Under this doctrine, which has
been the law in New York since the nineteenth century, there is
a presumption that employment is at will and therefore, may be
s°
freely terminated at any time with or without cause, so long as
the termination does not violate some other statutory
proscription, such as statutes outlawing discrimination.
Permitting an employee to challenge his termination in an
advisory arbitration allows the employee to "have his day in
court" and may serve the same therapeutic value as final and
This may result in less litigation,
binding arbitration."1
particularly if the employee does not prevail in the advisory
arbitration.
Essentially, labor arbitration provides unionized workers a
form of job security by requiring that an employer have just
cause prior to taking action against an employee. The lack of job
security is one of the reasons why employees may look to unions
for support. If the employer provides for advisory arbitration,
this may take away some of the incentives for employees to
unionize. Of course, organized labor will counter that advisory
arbitration is very different from labor arbitration and, therefore,
advisory arbitration does not effectively provide the same level of
job security as labor arbitration. Ultimately, the decision turns
on whether or not the employee wants to unionize, as well as how
important arbitration is to the employees.
Advisory arbitration is also a check on the power of
management. If a corporation loses in advisory arbitration, it
may bring certain personnel problems caused by lower level
supervisors to the attention of senior management.
Even with advisory arbitration, the employer still has some
flexibility to reject the proceeding, given the deferential standard
82
of judicial review applicable in article 78 proceedings. However,
Id. at 641, 651 N.E.2d at 874, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
There have been a number of New York Court of Appeal decisions that upheld
the employment-at-will doctrine. See Horn v. New York Times, 100 N.Y.2d 85, 9697, 790 N.E.2d 753, 759, 760 N.Y.S.2d 378, 384 (2003); Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d
628, 633, 609 N.E.2d 105, 107, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1992); Sabetay v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 506 N.E.2d 919, 920, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (1987);
Murphy v. Am. Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300-01, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1983); Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 462-63, 443
N.E.2d 441, 443-44, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195-96 (1982); Martin v. New York Life Ins.
417 (1895).
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E.416,
81 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 31.
79

80
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employers must consider the costs of advisory arbitration in
determining whether to implement such a policy. The costs of
advisory arbitration include lawyers' fees, staff, lost productivity
time as witnesses will not be at work, and the arbitrator's fee. 3
In the end, the employer who is considering advisory arbitration
is the one who must weigh the benefits with the costs. As a
practical matter, the individual employee is not going to have
enough bargaining power to insist on advisory arbitration.
Indeed, if the individual employee had this power, he or she
probably would insist on some type of binding arbitration.
The thought of utilizing advisory arbitration to resolve
employment-related disputes in the non-union workforce is not
as radical as it might seem. Under New York Civil Service Law
Section 75,84 permanent civil servants, whether they are in a
union or not, are entitled to a hearing to protest proposed
discipline and/or termination, but the public employer retains the
authority to reject the decision of the Hearing Officer-subject to
an article 78 standard of review.8 5 In a sense, the process is
similar to advisory arbitration.
Finally, although not required in New York because it is an
employment-at-will state, some employers may effectively
require "just cause" for their actions due to concerns over possible
claims of employment discrimination.86
Therefore, advisory
arbitration may not change the policies of employers already
According to one survey done in 2004, per diem fees for labor arbitrators
ranged from $350 to $2,400 per day with an average fee of $826 per day. COOPER ET
AL., supra note 2, at 21. Additionally, on average each case decided by an arbitrator
involves two days of study for each day of hearing. During this "study time,"
arbitrators review the record, undertake research, and draft a written arbitration
opinion and award. Id.
' N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75 (McKinney 1998).
85 See Tottey v. Varvayanis, 307 A.D.2d 652, 654-55, 762 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544-45
(3d Dep't) (article 78 proceeding filed after employer rejected recommendation of
Hearing Officer), appeal denied, 1 N.Y.3d. 501, 807 N.E.2d 288, 775 N.Y.S.2d 238
(2003); Spry v. Delaware County, 277 A.D.2d 779, 779, 716 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (3d
Dep't 2000)
Civil Service § 75 hearings are regarded by many as not providing employees
with effective due process protection. For a critical discussion of the Civil Service §
75 process, see James A. Brown, Fixing A Broken Disciplinary System, N.Y. L.J.,
April 21, 2004, at 4. Though Mr. Brown makes some very good points, for non-union
employees limited protection is better than no protection.
83

86 MICHAEL

J.

ZIMMER

ET AL.,

CASES

AND MATERIALS

ON

EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION 115 (6th ed. 2003). Indeed, as the authors point out, because of the
enactment of the various statutes which outlaw employment discrimination
employers are well advised to have just cause for their actions." Id.
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applying a "just cause" standard. However, it would provide the
employee with a forum to be heard.
Although advisory arbitration is predominately used in7
public-sector school district-union labor-management relations,
there does not appear to be any legal reason why it could not be
applied to private-sector labor and employment matters. In fact,
in labor and employment matters, courts adjudicating privatesector disputes have looked to public-sector decisions for
guidance. For example, in NLRB v. TransportationManagement
Corp.,ss the United States Supreme Court adopted the National
Labor Relation Board's ("NLRB") mixed motive test where it is
alleged that an employee was discharged for anti-union animus
and the employer claims that it would have terminated the
employee anyway. In adopting this test, the Court looked to a
First Amendment decision involving the discharge of a public
employee for guidance and held that it was proper for the NLRB
to initially draw an analogy to that First Amendment case. 9
Similarly, in employment law, courts have often looked to
decisions interpreting the older National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA")9 0 for guidance in interpreting legal issues such as those
involving employment discrimination. 9'
IV. THE LIMITS OF ADVISORY ARBITRATION AS COMPARED TO
FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION

Since 1991, there has been an explosion in the use of final
and binding arbitration to resolve employment disputes.92 In
87 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
88
89

462 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1983).
Id. at 403. Similarly, in NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir.

1993), in interpreting the National Labor Relations Act, the court followed a decision
which interpreted the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §
7101-35 (2000), which governs labor-management relation matters between the
federal government and its unions.
90 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (2000).
9' Indeed, the NLRA has been referred to as the "grandparent of most labor
laws." See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of PredischargeMisconduct Discovered
After an Employees' Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1990). In fact, the term "affirmative action" used in Title
VII is derived from the NLRA. Id. at 12 n.68.
92 In 1991, the Supreme Court ruled that an unrepresented employee could be
compelled to arbitrate his or her statutory claim because he executed a predispute
arbitration agreement. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
see also Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1998)
(discussing increased use of arbitration of statutory rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
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fact, a new term of art has been coined:
"employment
arbitration."93
Interestingly, outside of final and binding
arbitration before a labor arbitrator, many arbitrators issue
awards without any written opinions. New York has historically
not required an arbitrator to set forth his or her reasoning for the
award. 94 This practice, which is not unique to New York, 95 has
been judicially criticized.96
Since 1991, there is a significant amount of litigation over
the issue of whether or not an employee is barred from raising a
statutory claim in court by virtue of a pre-arbitration
agreement. 97 In the Second Circuit, however, the law is settledan employee generally does not give up his or her right to pursue
a statutory claim because of an arbitration agreement.9 8
Nevertheless, if the dispute is in a jurisdiction outside the
Second Circuit, advisory arbitration of employment disputes
should not be understood as replacing litigation of statutory
1034 (1999);

Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory

Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1344 (1997) ("Over the last decade, the Supreme Court...
has expanded the role of arbitration in the resolution of legal disputes ....
").
Given the explosion of ADR in this country, some commentators believe that
attorneys may have an obligation to inform their clients about ADR alternatives. See
Gerald F. Phillips, The Obligation of Attorneys to Inform Clients About ADR, 31 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 239, 244 (2004).

The law surrounding the contours of employment arbitration outside of collective
bargaining is still developing. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supranote 64, at § 1.28.
93 Dennis R. Nolan, Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 853, 853 (2002).
94 Halligan, 148 F.3d. at 204; Sussco Exterior Systems, Inc. v. Hercules
Construction Corp., 120 A.D.2d 532, 533, 502 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (2d Dept. 1986); Banc
of America Securities v. Knight, 4 Misc. 3d 756, 767, 781 N.Y.S.2d 829, 837-38 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 2004).
9'R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Necessity That Arbitrators, in Making Award, Make
Specific or Detailed Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, 82 A.L.R.2d 969-74
(1962) (surveying various jurisdictions).
96 Indeed, in Halligan and Banc of America Securities the courts
went so far as
to state that the absence of an explanation for the arbitration award may result in a
court having less confidence in it. See Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204; Banc of America
Securities, 4 Misc.3d at 767, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 837-38.
9'Dana T. Blackmore, An Employer's Guide to Understandingthe Arbitration of
Statutory Claims, 13 WORLD ARB. &cMEDIATION REP. 103, 104-07 (2002); Erica F.
Schohn, The Uncertain Future of Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the
Unionized Workplace, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 324 (2004) (discussing cases

in connection with unionized workers). It is beyond the scope of this Article to
further discuss arbitration of statutory claims.
9'Fayer v. Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001); Rogers v.
New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2000). This Article cites to Second Circuit
case law in this regard because this Article is predominately about New York law.
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rights.
Even final and binding arbitration must contain
procedural due process safeguards to preserve its finality. A
biased arbitration, for example, is akin to no arbitration.9 9
Where the arbitration forum is inadequate, courts have held that
agreements to arbitrate were unenforceable. °° It would appear
that advisory arbitration would be an inadequate forum to
present statutory claims due to the lack of finality.
Additionally, in the private sector, arbitration is considered
the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.0 1 In the private
sector, this policy is so significant that the law will imply that the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement have agreed to a nostrike clause,
if the agreement provides for final and binding
0 2
arbitration.1
However, if advisory arbitration were to be used in a privatesector collective bargaining agreement, in lieu of final and
binding arbitration, it should not be thought of as a quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike. Advisory arbitration not only
lacks the essential element of finality but, moreover, the law
surrounding final and binding arbitration is radically different.
Final and binding arbitration is intended to be just that-final
and binding. A final and binding arbitration is usually held
before one arbitrator, but in some industries, parties also select
partisan arbitrators. In such situations, the partisan arbitrators
99 As Professor Nolan explained: "It is simply not conceivable that the Supreme
Court intended to relegate employees with arbitration agreements to the mercies of
a system biased against them and their statutory claims." Dennis R. Nolan, supra
note 93, at 867 (discussing, in detail, procedural and substantive requirements for
minimal fairness in order for arbitration to be final and binding).
Additionally, lopsided arbitration agreements which, for example, impose
prohibitive costs on employees or give the employer undue control over the selection
of the arbitrator, are generally not enforced. COOPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 617-18.
'0o Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001) (arbitration provision which gives employer
unfettered discretion is illusory and not enforceable); Hooters of America, Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-40 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that an arbitration
agreement that gives the employer the right to select arbitrators utilizes biased
rules that allow the employer to vacate the award, allows the employer to transcribe
the proceeding, and limits the presentation of proof by employees is unenforceable);
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (for arbitration of
statutory rights to be enforceable arbitration must include both substantive
protection and access to a neutral forum in which to enforce those protections);
Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997 (S.D. Ind.
2001) (arbitration agreement unenforceable due to inadequate forum).
10' Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
102 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962).
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usually vote along party lines with the neutral in effect making
the decision. 0 3
Section 7511(b)(1) of the New York C.P.L.R. sets forth the
basis upon which a party that has participated in an arbitration
may seek to vacate the resulting award. 4 There is an extremely
narrow standard of judicial review. As the Court of Appeals has
explained:
An arbitration may be vacated on three narrow grounds: "it
violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds0 5a
specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."'
The Court of Appeals has held that vacatur is only
appropriate in "limited circumstances" and that courts must pay
particular deference to arbitration. In New York State Correction
Officers v. New York, 10 6 the Court described the scope of its
judicial review as follows:
Collective bargaining agreements commonly provide for binding
arbitration to settle contractual disputes between employees
and management. In circumstances when the parties agree to
submit their dispute to an arbitrator, courts generally play a
limited role. Courts are bound by an arbitrator's factual
findings, interpretation of the contract and judgment concerning
remedies. A court cannot examine the merits of an arbitration
103 See Seth H. Lieberman, Note, Something is Rotten In The State of PartyAppointed Arbitration: Healing ADR's Black Eye That Is "NonneutralNeutrals," 5
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 215, 223-26 (2004).
04 New York C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1) provides that an award may be vacated if the
court finds that the rights of a party were prejudiced by:
(i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where the
award was by confession; or
(iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded his
power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made; or
(iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the party applying
to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of defect and
without objection.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1) (McKinney 1998).
New York law is often ignored in private-sector labor-management relations due
to the misguided perception that federal law preempts state law in this area. See
Rubinstein, supra note 1, at 35.
105 United Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 1 N.Y.3d 72, 79, 810 N.E.2d 827, at
832, 769 N.Y.S.2d 451, 456 (2003) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Arlington Teachers Ass'n,
78 N.Y.2d 33, 574 N.E.2d 1031, 571 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1989)). For a discussion of the law
concerning final and binding arbitration under New York law, see Rubinstein, supra
note 1.
'0694 N.Y.2d 321, 726 N.E.2d 462, 704 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1999).
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award and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator
simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better
one. Indeed, even in circumstances where an arbitrator makes
role of overseers
errors of law or fact, courts will not assume the
10 7
to conform the award to their sense of justice.

Thus, the party seeking to vacate an arbitration bears a "heavy
burden."'' 8
There are only a few exceptions to the concept of finality.
One exception exits where a union breaches its duty of fair
representation. 0 9 A breach of such a duty is quite rare and only
occurs when the union acts in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or
bad-faith manner towards its members."0 Another exception
107

Id. at 326, 726 N.E.2d at 465-66, 704 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13.

10 See Erie County. Sheriffs Police Benevolent Ass'n v. County of Erie, 299

A.D.2d 857, 858, 750 N.Y.S.2d 544, 544 (4th Dep't 2002).
09 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1976) (applying
private-sector federal law); Bd. of Educ. v. Ambach, 70 N.Y.2d 501, 517 N.E.2d 509,
522 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1987) (applying New York law).
"0 With respect to the duty of fair representation ("DFR") New York Courts
have adopted the same DFR standards as federal courts. See Symanski v. E.
Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 117 A.D.2d 18, 502 N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d Dep't 1986); Albino v.
City of New York, 80 A.D.2d 261, 438 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1981). The duty of fair
representation may be traced to federal law. Baker v. Bd. of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 314,
319, 520 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (1987). A cause of action for breach of the DFR is actually
a hybrid action involving the Board's breach of contract and the union's breach of
duty. Obot v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 89 N.Y.2d 883, 886, 675 N.E.2d 1197,
1198, 653 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (1996). As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
"To prevail against either the company or the Union .... [employeeplaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the
contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of the
duty by the Union"'
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983) (alterations in original) (quoting
UPS v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) and Hines, 424
U.S. at 570-71 (1976)); see also Commodari v. Long Island Univ., 89 F. Supp. 2d 353,
370-72 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that DFR cause of action could not be established
because no breach of duty was found), affd, 62 Fed. Appx. 28 (2d Cir. 2003).
Under the duty of fair representation, the law recognizes that a labor union is
not legally accountable to an employee for any and all working conditions, problems
or conflicts that the employee has on the job. Rather, the law provides that a union
which is the exclusive bargaining representative of a defined group of employees,
has a duty to fairly represent employees. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)
(stating that DFR breach occurs if union actions are arbitrary, discriminatory or in
bad faith).
In Civil Service Bar Ass'n, Local 237 v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 188, 474
N.E.2d 587, 485 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1984), the Court of Appeals recognized that a Union's
basic purpose is to address the needs of unit members who at times face conflicting
or different situations. Id. at 197, 474 N.E.2d at 591, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 231. In Jacobs
v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 64 A.D.2d 148, 409 N.Y.S.2d 234
(2d Dep't 1978), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 1075 (1979), the Second Department
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concerns the finality of labor arbitration decisions in cases that
are also representational in nature under the NLRA.1 ' In this
type of case, the determination of questions concerning
representation involves the application of statutory policy and
criteria. 2 Perhaps the most significant exception occurs in so
called "deferral cases," where the issue could be an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA," 3 as well as a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement.1 1 4 A classic example of this occurs when.a
held that the courts should not become involved in second guessing unions. Id. at
157-58, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
Similarly, in Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33 (1998), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that union's must be given a 'wide range of reasonableness'. . . to
make discretionary decisions and choices, even if those judgments are ultimately
wrong." Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added) (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n-Int'l v. O'Neill,
499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991) and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)).
Judicial review of a union's actions is considered to be "highly deferential." See
Spellacy, Jr. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n-Int'l, 156 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S.
65, 78 (1991).
A breach of the duty of fair representation is an improper practice under the
New York Taylor Law. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a (1998); see also In re Grassel, 33
N.Y. PERB 33-3038 (2000) (applicable to public sector employees in New York),
affd, 301 A.D.2d 522 (2d Dep't 2003). It is also an unfair labor practice under the
National Labor Relations Act. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n
Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 78, 86-87 (1989) (applicable to most private sector
employers).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the duty of fair representation in
greater detail. For a description of some of the issues that come up in this area, see
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, A New York Court Recognizes a Labor Union Evidentiary
Privilege, 9 LAB. LAW. 595 (1993).

. A typical representation matter before the NLRB, the administrative agency
created by the NLRA, occurs when a group of unrepresented employees desire a
union. These employees can petition the NLRB for a secret ballot election to
determine whether or not a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit for
bargaining desire a union. See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note

1, at 444-758.
112 See NLRB v. Paper Mfr. Co., 786 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1986); Tweedle Litho, Inc.,
337 N.L.R.B. 686 (2002); Ziegler Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 949 (2001); Williams Transp. Co.,
233 N.L.R.B. 837 (1977).

...29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
114Under Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), and its progeny, there
are several criteria that must be met if the Board is to defer to an arbitrator's
decision. They are as follows: (1) The unfair labor practice must have been presented
to and considered by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitration proceeding must appear to
have been fair and regular; (3) all parties to the arbitration must have agreed to be
bound; and (4) the decision of the arbitrator is not clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act. Id. at 1082; see also 8 CANAN & GREGORY, supra note 6, §
10779 (discussing NLRB's deferral policy); GETMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 226-42
(discussing NLRB's deferral policy) If the NLRB "defers" to the arbitrator, they will
not decide the case.
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terminated employee asserts that he or she was terminated
without "just cause" under a collective bargaining agreement
and, additionally, because of his or her union activities in
violation of the NLRA.15
CONCLUSION

Advisory arbitration is not for everyone. Its value in private
and public-sector labor relations is certainly questionable.
However, it may offer some measure of protection and industrial
due process to unrepresented employees. In the United States,
just cause protection for non-union workers is virtually nonexistent. 11 6 At the very least, it offers employees the chance to
formally argue their case. By providing employees with this
forum, corporations may actually save money because it may
decrease the amount of litigation. Sometimes just giving an
employee the opportunity to tell his or her side of the story and
giving the employer the opportunity to formally explain its
actions may have a therapeutic effect, which in turn may
decrease the amount of litigation. However, since unrepresented
employees have virtually no bargaining power, the employer is
the one who must decide whether or not it will unilaterally offer
advisory arbitration.
If advisory arbitration takes hold, written opinions, though
not required under current law, would certainly be in the parties'
interest. Written opinions provide a record that a reviewing
court could examine. In time, they may also form a body of case
law outlining employment rights and responsibilities. Of course,
requiring arbitrators to issue a formal written opinion increases
the time and expense of the advisory arbitration. Unlike the
unionized sector, where unions typically pay one-half the cost of
the arbitration, the employer probably would have to foot the
entire bill, unless the employee agrees to do so. However, there
is a material difference between a union servicing its members by
paying for part of an advisory arbitration, and having an
individual employee pay that same amount.
Due to the lack of finality, advisory arbitration is not an
Under New York's Taylor Law, PERB also defers to decisions of arbitrators.
37-4546 (2004) (citing New York City
United Univ. Professions, 37 N.Y. PERB
Transit Auth., 4 N.Y. PERB 4-3031 (1971)).
"t
See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1371.
16 See HARPER ETAL., supra note 1, at 721.
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appropriate forum to litigate statutory rights, unless the
employee retains the right to bring his statutory claim in court.
Additionally, because of the lack of finality, advisory arbitration
in the private sector should not be considered as the quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike.
Though advisory arbitration is basically a product of publicsector labor-management relations in the field of public
education, there are no policy reasons why it could not be
adopted in the private sector.' 17 In fact, in employment law,
courts often look to other labor statutes for guidance.'18
Suggesting that employers voluntarily agree to advisory
arbitration may not be a radical idea when one considers that
most of the American workforce is without any real due process
protection against arbitrary employer action. Indeed, Professors
Julius G. Getman, David L. Gregory, and attorney Bertrand B.
Pogrebin suggest that it might be appropriate to have some form
of labor arbitration in the non-union environment in order to
provide non-union employees with industrial due process." 9
While I certainly would favor this, it does not appear realistic. It
seems as though a useful middle ground in the unorganized
sector may, in fact, be advisory arbitration.

17 See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text (describing
the use of advisory
arbitration).
118 See supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
19 GETMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 240-42.

